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LOOK WHO IS TALKING … AND WHO IS LISTENING:  
Finding an integrative “we” voice in entrepreneurial scholarship 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the relationship between the study of entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs 
we study. While scholars typically adopt a detached, third-person stance for the purpose of 
explaining and predicting entrepreneurial action, entrepreneurs instead operate in a first-person 
stance of deciding what to do. The two stances cannot be reduced to one another. We argue 
that an engaged dialogue – a second-person stance – can bring scholars and entrepreneurs 
together into a unifying practical decision-making perspective. By working to develop this 
integrative voice in scholarship, we can collapse the dualism of rigour and relevance.  
 
 
Introduction 
The interplay between theory and practice reveals itself in the tension between rigour 
and relevance in research (e.g. Frank and Landstrom, 2016; Hodkinson and Rousseau, 2009). 
The pure pursuit of rigour creates boundaries around academic conversations, as communities 
develop around their idiosyncratic disciplinary training and research perspectives (Gartner, 
Davidsson, and Zahra, 2006), and produces esoteric theorizing (Wiklund, Wright and Zahra, 
2018). In the spirit of closing this gap, the notion of engaged scholarship has emerged as 
“participative form of research for obtaining the different perspectives of key stakeholders in 
studying complex problems” (Van de Ven, 2007: p. 9). At the same time, its ethos poses a 
deeper question of scholarly accountability: for whom do we write? As we will argue below, 
this question is particularly pertinent to the domain of entrepreneurship as distinct from 
organization and management studies.  
One useful way of addressing the question “For whom do we write?” is by asking “To 
whom do we make ourselves accountable for what we write in our scholarly publications?” or 
“To whom do we have to justify what we say?” Typically, it is other scholars who will be 
potential reviewers, editors, readers, and responders rather than the entrepreneurs about whom 
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we are writing. As a result, most entrepreneurship scholarship consists of conversations 
between academics about entrepreneurs but excludes the perspectives of the entrepreneurs 
being discussed. When entrepreneurship scholars try to explain theoretically entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making practices from a purely third-person perspective, it is often for the purpose of 
being better able to predict or even influence how entrepreneurs will make decisions in certain 
contexts. However, entrepreneurs themselves adopt a first-person perspective on their 
decision-making. They are not interested in predicting what they will do, but deciding what 
they should do in their specific situation. We will argue this distinction poses a serious 
challenge for entrepreneurship scholars because what distinguishes entrepreneurs from non-
entrepreneurs is their first-person practical intention to venture off the beaten path. If we as 
scholars lose contact with entrepreneurs’ first-person practical decision-making perspective 
then we are in great danger of not merely becoming irrelevant to practicing entrepreneurs, but 
of failing to even study the core phenomena we claim to be studying—however “rigorously” 
we do it.  
Unlike the broader field of organization and management studies – in which the 
phenomenon is well defined in that it pertains to organizations and managerial activities that 
already exist – the phenomenon of entrepreneurship is future focused (Venkataraman, 1997), 
yet is to be studied in the present. In stepping into the unknown or the unaccustomed, 
entrepreneurs disclose new worlds (Spinoza, Flores and Dreyfus, 1997; Sarasvathy, 2012) that 
are yet to emerge and thus may not be immediately understood or accepted, pursuing initiatives 
that venture capitalist Mark Andreessen calls ‘non-consensus’ or plain crazy. Therefore, to 
appreciate the entrepreneurial is to become sensitive to the practical context of the acting 
entrepreneur, turning it into a dialogical space, entwining scholars’ conceptual rigour with 
entrepreneurs’ openness to novelty. In short, we need to look behind the label “entrepreneur”.  
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Yet, in the body of work we have created as entrepreneurship scholars, we take the 
entrepreneur for granted, as distinctly familiar. We take it as given that certain empirical 
observations represent instances of entrepreneurship or operate with the abstract categories of 
entrepreneurship, entrepreneur, and entrepreneurial action, of which we presume that empirical 
instances exist. In so doing, we overlook the very conditions from which these categories arise, 
and thus miss what distinguishes them from other topics, persons, and actions. 
Ten years ago, this hunch arose in the Unbearable Elusiveness of Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities as the category that defines entrepreneurs (Dimov, 2011).  It was grounded in a 
distinction between formalist and substantive conception of opportunities – the formalist 
conception seeking to capture opportunities in an a-personal sense as an encompassing concept, 
and the substantive conception recognizing that the opportunity concept is just a gateway to 
uncovering the multitude of idiosyncratic ways that people venture forward. A formalist 
conception helps impose meaning from the outside using a third-personal perspective, while 
the substantivist conception helps uncover meaning from within the entrepreneur’s first-person 
perspective, i.e. reveal the diverse, personal nature of being entrepreneurial. There are thus two 
distinct scholarly points of view elicited by these conceptions: one of an external observer 
committed to objective, stable points of reference and the other of an engaged dialogist 
committed to the shared interests of coping with the vicissitudes of the world. That these views 
largely remain disjointed is puzzling, to say the least. 
This paper aims to bring these views together into an integrative conception of 
entrepreneurial scholarship. To do so, we outline and reflect on the tensions between the third-
person tenets of rigorous research and the first-person substance of entrepreneurial practice. 
We then seek common ground in the mediating role of a second-person perspective, the 
development of scholarly sensitivity to the substantive questions of entrepreneurial practice, 
and enacting a stance of accountability to the entrepreneurs we study.  
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The Literary Tribe 
In the 1970s, Bruno Latour conducted an anthropological study of a scientific 
laboratory, aiming “to observe scientists with the same cold and unblinking eye with which 
cells, or hormones, or chemical reactions are studied” (Latour and Woolgar, 1979: 12) and to 
translate the observations into the code of his profession. “It strikes our observer that its 
members are compulsive and almost manic writers. Every bench has a large leatherbound book 
in which members meticulously record what they have just done against a certain code number. 
This appears strange because our observer has only witnessed such diffidence in memory in 
the work of a few particularly scrupulous novelists” (48). This outside observer perceived “an 
essential similarity between the inscription capabilities of apparatus, the manic passion for 
marking, coding, and filing, and the literary skills of writing, persuasion, and discussion” (51). 
Even manipulating the brains of rats could be seen as an activity that eventually produces a 
high value diagram. “For the observer, then, the laboratory began to take on the appearance of 
a system of literary inscription” (52). From the perspective of the scientists participating in the 
research, however, the anthropologist observer misses the point of their activity. 
Now imagine that you present a scholarly paper on an entrepreneurship topic at a 
management research conference. After your presentation, you meet someone who says that 
they are trying to learn more about entrepreneurship theory and then enthusiastically asks you 
if they could read and provide you with comments on your paper. A few weeks later, the person 
contacts you and explains that they found your paper fascinating in virtue of it fitting into a 
certain citation pattern, using certain grammatical forms, and creating a certain emotional tone 
by using certain types of words. The commenter then presents various suggestions along these 
dimensions to help you increase the number of citations you are likely to receive once 
published. Further discussion reveals the person to be agnostic about what your research 
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question is, what your answer is, and how you answered it. It turns out that this person studies 
entrepreneurship theory by collecting scholarly papers on entrepreneurship and then 
computationally analyses citation patterns, grammatical styles, and emotional tone and relates 
these to citation counts. It is unclear why anyone would care to do this, but we are assured of 
the rigour of the methods and of the goal of providing new insight into entrepreneurship theory. 
From the perspective of those of us building, debating, and refining entrepreneurship 
theory, this strange person does not even know what the theory is, and seems to only be able 
to identify papers as being about entrepreneurship by virtue of being presented at conferences 
(or conference sessions) about entrepreneurship. It would thus seem unclear to us how such a 
research project could provide us with useful insights into entrepreneurship theory. It seems 
that if one wanted to research entrepreneurship theory then one would at least need to know 
what the theory is for, what its key claims are, what the arguments behind it are, and the general 
academic conversation surrounding it. Divorced from all these things, “entrepreneurship” 
theory becomes little more than a word associated with certain text documents. One can 
rigorously analyse these texts as mere data, but it would not be an analysis of entrepreneurship 
theory as theory. To understand these documents as being about entrepreneurship theory one 
cannot look at the text as mere data, but as a contribution to the scholarly conversation in which 
the texts play a role. This is not a trivial matter. One does not read scholarly articles in the same 
way that one reads fiction, newspaper articles, or letters from friends. Part of becoming a 
scholar is learning how to read scholarly texts in one’s discipline. 
Just as the scientists in Latour’s study might react with anger at being represented as 
participants in some literary activity, so too would we entrepreneurship scholars be put on edge 
by the strange person’s claim that they study entrepreneurship theory by examining citation 
patterns etc. And yet, we could appear strange to the community of entrepreneurial 
practitioners in a way that is closely analogous to the way that the peculiar entrepreneurship 
 7 
researcher appears to us. Just as the peculiar entrepreneurship researcher identifies us as 
entrepreneurship scholars by virtue of our attending certain conferences or publishing in 
particular journals, so do we identify entrepreneurs by their having recently registered their 
business, indicating self-employment status in a national labor survey, or being included in the 
Kauffman database. Just as we can dismiss the strange person as having no idea about the 
substance of entrepreneurship theory, so too can we be dismissed as having limited idea about 
the substance of entrepreneurial activity.  
In each of the these cases—the anthropologist studying the lab scientists, the peculiar 
entrepreneurship theory researcher studying scholarly texts, and entrepreneurship scholars 
studying entrepreneurs—those studying the practices of others do not make themselves and 
their characterizations of the practices accountable to those whose practices are being studied. 
 
Where is Wally / Waldo / Holger / Charlie / Walter? 
Where's Wally? is a series of books from British illustrator Martin Handford. They 
challenge us to find the elusive Wally with his iconic features amongst busy, intricate scenes. 
Over 30 years, the books have sold over 70 million copies worldwide in 31 languages. In the 
USA and Canada, Wally is Waldo, in Denmark Holger, in France Charlie, and in Germany 
Walter. Likewise, in the busyness of daily business life, our challenge as entrepreneurship 
scholars is to find the “entrepreneurs” so that we can observe and understand what they do.  
Imagine for a moment walking into an airport lounge, train station, café or office 
building, and then trying to identify an entrepreneur. What would be required? Whereas Wally 
retains his iconic visual features across pages and languages, entrepreneurs cannot be so readily 
identified by sensory cues, and without appeal to language. This makes the identification of 
entrepreneurs notably different from the identification of other social or professional roles that 
people perform. In many cases, we can use the situational setting and artefacts to make 
 8 
inferences about the person: if we see them finishing wood and assembling a chair, we could 
identify the person as a carpenter; if we see a person standing in front of children seated in 
rows, we could identify the person as a teacher; if we see a person using a stethoscope to 
examine someone’s lungs, we could identify the person as a doctor. In each of these cases we 
can make reasonable estimates about the roles people play without drawing from any sort of 
verbal cues. In contrast, entrepreneurs, cannot be identified in this way. Even if we are familiar 
with the settings in which people act and with the artefacts people use, we would still not be 
able to single out anyone as an entrepreneur unless we were to attend to and understand what 
they say and write. A linguistic description is indispensable, particularly when all that is driving 
a person’s actions is their vision of a different world (Dimov, 2018), when they connect the 
dots around us in ways that we cannot yet intuit (Baron, 2006). 
Neither who the people are (e.g. Gartner, 1989) nor what they are doing (in a bodily 
sense) are necessary or sufficient evidence for classifying them as entrepreneurs. In this sense, 
“entrepreneur” is a role that we ascribe to people based on the meaning of their actions, rather 
than on the basis of their observable behaviour. In the absence of any tangible markers (e.g. 
company, website, products, registrations, etc.) in the very early stages of a process that can 
eventually be described as entrepreneurial once such markers become enacted, we are left with 
a person’s vision and intention as the only sources of meaning for their actions.  
In his seminal work, Mind in Society, Vygotsky (1978) articulates the idea that, with 
the development of abstract thought, meaning begins to dominate action and, in this way, action 
becomes a pivot through which a person can move in a field of meaning. The fields of vision 
and meaning begin to diverge once children can separate object and concept to create imaginary 
situations in which thought becomes separated from objects. These ideas suggest that the 
meaning of an action that would lead us to describe the person behind it as “entrepreneur” 
arises from the imaginary situation (field of meaning) in which the person operates via this 
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action. In entrepreneurship research, this imaginary situation is captured by the notion of 
opportunity as a possibility for introducing new goods or services (Venkataraman, 1997). The 
label “imaginary” is appropriate here as the initial articulation of what an entrepreneur is trying 
to do is nothing but a linguistic act (Dimov, 2018). It is by virtue of envisioning such an 
imaginary situation – to which the person can meaningfully refer as “opportunity” – and acting 
under its guidance, that the person “becomes” an entrepreneur.  
In this sense, the entrepreneurial role is defined by particular states of consciousness 
and intentionality. What is unique about consciousness and intentionality is that they have a 
first-person ontology and, as such, are not reducible ontologically to neurophysiology, even if 
they can be causally explained by neurophysiological processes (Searle, 1994). The key, as 
Searle points out, is making explicit the distinction between ontology (what is it?), 
epistemology (how do we find out about it?) and causation (what does it do?). The quest for 
objectivity makes epistemology assume a third-person stance, yet “the third-person character 
of the epistemology should not blind us to the fact that the actual ontology of mental states is 
a first-person ontology” (§261). Mental states are always someone’s mental states – the first-
person point of view is primary. In other words, a first-person ontology is not reducible to a 
third-person ontology, i.e. “a mode of existence that is independent of any experiencing agent” 
(Searle, 1994). 
The question for us as entrepreneurial scholars is how to gain access to the first-person 
perspective of the entrepreneur when we are not the entrepreneur. It is in a first-person sense 
that the entrepreneur’s practical decision-making perspective reveals itself, defined by the 
question of deciding what should be done, rather than predicting what will (likely) be done.   
 
First-Person versus Third-Person Perspectives on the Reasons for Entrepreneurial 
Action 
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We argued above that what distinguishes entrepreneurial from non-entrepreneurial 
action is the intention or reasons behind the action which give it its meaning. Furthermore, we 
argued that it is only through language that entrepreneurial intentions can be expressed and 
examined—particularly in the early stages of the entrepreneurial process. Thus, one important 
way for distinguishing between first- and third-person perspectives on the reasons for 
entrepreneurial action is through statements which articulate the reasons for those actions. 
Suppose that entrepreneur E intends to do entrepreneurial action A. Let us also suppose that 
R1, R2, R3…etc are different reasons that might be espoused for why E does A. Person 1, 
Person 2, and Person 3 are people other than entrepreneur E.  
• First-person perspective: E says to Person 1, “I have decided to do A because R1” 
• Third-person perspective: Person 2 says to Person 3, “E has decided to do A because 
R2” 
The first-person perspective on A belongs to the entrepreneur who intends on 
performing that action. The scholar studying the entrepreneur may be tempted to see what E 
says to Person 1 as merely a report of E’s intention and their reasons—thus as something to be 
recorded as data. Unfortunately, when scholars do this, they miss the practical social 
significance behind the speech act that is distinctive to its expressing a first-person perspective. 
When E speaks to Person 1 she is trying to justify her decision to person 1 with the invitation 
and expectation that Person 1 will hold her rationally responsible and perhaps challenge the 
soundness of the reason and the appropriateness of the decision. E might say, for example, “I 
have decided to start this venture because I have developed a great product that people would 
pay a lot of money to own.” Furthermore, the reason that E gives would very likely not be of 
the causal-psychological sort. For example, it would be rather peculiar for E to say, “I have 
decided to continue investing in this because I have fallen victim to the sunk costs fallacy”, or 
“I have decided to start this venture because I have unusually high levels of self-confidence.” 
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E would not say such things as someone in the midst of deciding how to act and trying to justify 
their action to their audience. Rather, E would only say such things as someone observing their 
own action as a phenomenon to be explained, as people sometimes do when they reflect on 
why they made some past decision. 
The third-person perspective on entrepreneurial action A is the one commonly adopted 
by entrepreneurship scholars in conversation with one another. It belongs to someone who is 
neither the entrepreneur performing the action, nor someone in conversation with that 
entrepreneur. Therefore, even though Person 2 and Person 3 are exchanging reasons with one 
another as they converse about E, they are not talking to E and thus may not be making 
themselves accountable to E, nor adopting E’s practical decision-making perspective in 
deciding the appropriateness of the action. In this context the reasons that Person 2 and Person 
3 might give one another for why E decides to do entrepreneurial action A could very well be 
of the causal-explanatory form. They are reasons in the sense that they allow Person 2 and 
Person 3 to make predictions about the actions the entrepreneur might undertake, rather than 
being reasons given to the entrepreneur for why they should or should not undertake the action. 
From the third-person perspective one can thus treat entrepreneur E and her decision-making 
as phenomena to be explained rather than as an autonomous person with a practical decision-
making perspective to be engaged with and shared. 
 As can be seen, the difference between first-person versus third-person perspectives on 
the reasons for entrepreneurial action is not simply grammatical. It is not just a matter of 
substituting first-person pronouns with third-person pronouns (or proper names), turning 
sentences such as “I decided to do that because….” into “She decided to do that because…”. 
The critical difference between first- and third-person perspectives on reasons for 
entrepreneurial action does not just lie in whose action is being discussed, but in who is talking 
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to whom about whose action. It determines whether the reasons given are about the 
entrepreneurial decision-maker, or for the entrepreneurial decision-maker. 
When scholars treat reasons expressed from the first-person perspective as mere data 
rather than as socially situated speech-acts serving particular practical purposes they destroy 
crucial distinction between first and third-person perspectives. This frees these scholars to 
(mis)interpret entrepreneurs’ reasons given in the first-person perspective as though they were 
from the same third-person perspective adopted by the scholar. It thus allows scholars to ignore 
the substance of the entrepreneurs’ reasons—as pertaining whether a certain action should or 
should not be undertaken—so that the scholar can instead treat all entrepreneurs’ reasons as 
mere psycho-social reports from which predictions are to be made. This may seem like an 
innocuous simplifying assumption, but it comes at a great cost: we miss the point of 
entrepreneurs’ first-person reasons, just as the peculiar entrepreneurship scholar (discussed 
above) misses the point of entrepreneurship theory when they study entrepreneurship papers 
using complex citations analyses.  
 
Korsgaard on Theoretical vs Practical Reasons for Action 
 Philosopher Christine Korsgaard (1996) makes an insightful distinction between two 
different attitudes that people can adopt when giving reasons for action: theoretical and 
practical. In simplest terms, the difference between these is that the former involves asking, 
“What action will be performed given what we know of the various causal antecedents in play?” 
and the latter involves asking, “What action should be performed given what we know of the 
situation and the various ends desired?” From the theoretical perspective, actions are seen as 
deterministic phenomena to be explained and predicted according to causal regularities like 
any other natural phenomena. From the practical perspective agents are seen as autonomous 
and actions are seen as free and open to decision, thus standing in need of justification rather 
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than explanation. Therefore, the practical perspective is thoroughly normative in ways that the 
theoretical perspective is not. None of this suggests that intentional actions are uncaused, but 
only that the logic of causal explanation/prediction is different from the logic of practical 
justification. Korsgaard points out, “the two standpoints cannot be mixed because these two 
enterprises - explanation and decision - are mutually exclusive” (204). The causal laws of 
theory are about us – they describe and explain what we do. In contrast, the considerations of 
practice are addressed to us (for us) – they govern what we do. In this sense, there is no 
standpoint from which both the theoretical and practical conceptions apply, “for freedom is a 
concept with a practical employment, used in the choice and justification of action, not in 
explanation or prediction; while causality is a concept of theory, used to explain and predict 
actions but not to justify them” (204).  
This distinction between the first-person practical perspective and the third-person 
theoretical perspective on entrepreneurial action creates the difficult situation whereby much 
of mainstream entrepreneurship scholarship adopts a third-person perspective and is thus 
unable to identify or address the sorts of first-person intentions that are distinctive of 
entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial action. The very thing that makes an action entrepreneurial 
is the intention behind it (as argued above), and intentions are defined by their justificatory role 
in first-person practical reasoning (Brandom, 1994). An entrepreneur’s intention is her reason 
for deciding to act in a particular way, not the entrepreneurship scholar’s reason for predicting 
that the entrepreneur will act in a particular way. Paradoxically, the more that entrepreneurship 
scholars try to study entrepreneurial action from a detached third-person perspective, the less 
they can address those aspects of action that make them distinctively entrepreneurial. In the 
extreme (but common) case, entrepreneurship scholars are in danger of looking a lot like the 
peculiar researcher of entrepreneurship theory who studies citation-patterns and grammatical 
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forms rather than engaging with the actual content of entrepreneurship theories. In both cases 
the researchers miss the point of the practices they claim to be studying rigorously.  
 
Sharing Practical Decision-Making Perspectives 
 In light of the discussion above, we are left with the following question, “If we cannot 
identify and fruitfully study entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial action from a detached third-
person theoretical perspective, then how can we study entrepreneurial phenomena without 
ourselves becoming entrepreneurs?” The answer, we will argue, lies in our ability to integrate 
practical decision-making perspectives shared with others through mutual accountability. 
Korsgaard argues that the foundation of ethical behaviour between two individuals 
resides in their valuing one another’ ends simply in virtue of the other person having chosen 
them. Once people adopt and share each other’s ends, they then hold one another responsible 
for judgments about the means to achieving those ends, just as they would hold themselves 
responsible for such judgments. Accordingly, these persons would make themselves 
accountable to others’ reasons just as they make themselves accountable to (and take seriously) 
their own reasons. This sharing of ends and reciprocity of reasons brings people together into 
a unifying practical decision-making perspective. They are working together—keeping one 
another accountable—to achieve some mutually shared ends.  
We thus share a practical decision-making perspective with someone by finding value 
in the ends that they value and sharing reasons with that person in regard to achieving that end. 
This does not require that we wish for the same ends for ourselves, but only that we can see 
those ends as valuable because they are valued and chosen by persons whose autonomy we 
respect. For example, people will commonly value and promote the hobbies and aspirations of 
their spouses not because they hold the same aspirations and hobbies, but simply because those 
aspirations and hobbies were the ones chosen by their spouses. Likewise, we might help direct 
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a stranger to a particular religious institution in which they want to participate even if we have 
no personal inclination towards that (or any) religion. The person’s attending their religious 
meeting becomes valuable to us because it is valuable to them as people whose autonomy of 
choice we respect. Had the stranger wanted to get to the airport instead then that is what would 
have been valuable to us. 
Essential to sharing a perspective is a mutual reciprocity whereby persons hold one 
another responsible for taking (or intending to take) different courses of action. Even though 
our interaction with the stranger is very brief, it nonetheless involves our sharing reasons from 
within their practical decision-making perspective. We cannot simply state how we personally 
would get to the desired location, because this may not be helpful to the stranger. We have to 
engage the stranger to find out what sorts of directions will be appropriate for them in relation 
to their and our knowledge of the city, what mode of transportation is most appropriate, and 
what navigational devices (e.g. GPS or maps) are available. Importantly, the interaction will 
fail if the stranger disregards our statements about the lay of city, or we disregard their 
statements about what they do and do not know of the city, and what their preferred mode of 
transportation is. We must be responsible to each other in order to achieve the desired ends, or 
even clearly understand what the desired end is.  
 Expectations of reciprocity of ends and reasons can vary substantially across different 
types of interpersonal relationships. For example, spouses would have greater expectations of 
reciprocity between one another than strangers would. However, a certain minimum amount 
must be present for there to exist any mutual understanding and ethical behaviour between 
individuals—or even to be able to recognize someone as a practical decision-maker. It is 
precisely this sort of respect for individual’s autonomy and their choice of ends which grounds 
the importance of consent in liberal society. We limit our own autonomy out of respect towards 
the autonomy of others. The alternative is to treat individuals not as autonomous persons but 
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as objects that we can manipulate and control for our own ends—without any care or 
consideration for how our actions impact their pursuing their own ends. 
 
Adopting the Second-Person Perspective on Entrepreneurial Action 
 While our focus here is not specifically on the foundation of ethics, Korsgaard’s 
account of reciprocity and perspective-sharing provides a key insight into solving the problem 
of how entrepreneurship scholars could gain access to entrepreneurs’ first-person perspectives 
and the entrepreneurial vision embedded in them. Even though entrepreneurship scholars 
cannot gain access to an entrepreneur’s vision or intention by passively observing it, they can 
integrate it into their work by actively sharing in the entrepreneur’s practical decision-making 
perspective. That is, in addition to studying entrepreneurs as phenomenal objects whose 
behaviour we try to predict and explain—a perspective that serves policy purposes but one 
from which entrepreneurial intention is inaccessible— we can also study entrepreneurs as 
fellow rational and autonomous agents with whom we can share practical-decision 
perspectives. 
The obvious question becomes, how would sharing a practical decision-making 
perspective with an entrepreneur allow an entrepreneurship scholar to have access to the 
intentions which make someone an entrepreneur? The answer to this question lies in the close 
relationship between intentions and justification of action. A key part of what distinguishes 
action from mere involuntary bodily behaviour (e.g. a muscle twitch) is, not surprisingly, 
intention. According to some well-developed theories of action, what distinguishes intentions 
from mere causes of bodily behaviour is that they are subject to rational justifications 
(Brandom, 1994; Davidson, 1963). We can try to give a causal explanation for unintentional 
behaviours (e.g. tripping and falling), but upon having characterized the behaviour as 
unintentional it makes no sense to demand a rational justification for it in the same way that 
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we might demand justification for someone who acts intentionally (e.g. dropping to the 
ground—perhaps to hide from someone). Neither does it make any sense for someone to say 
that they intend to accidentally trip and fall in the future—though it makes perfect sense for 
them to predict that it will happen at some point.  
 What the foregoing discussion reveals is that if entrepreneurship scholars wanted to 
study entrepreneurial intentions then we cannot just talk about entrepreneurs. We need to talk 
to entrepreneurs to get at and understand their reasons. This goes beyond immersive research 
approaches such as ethnography, open or semi-structured interviews or diary studies in that we 
play a more active, participative role of holding them responsible and perhaps challenging their 
reasons (and they ours). Through this, we could meaningfully deploy the conceptual arsenal of 
our third-person vocabulary, making it accountable to the entrepreneur while also prompting 
new articulation of their reasons. What we are therefore proposing is that we can access an 
entrepreneur’s first-person practical decision-making perspective on their action by adopting a 
second-person practical perspective towards the entrepreneur and their action. Indeed, this 
mirrors Korsgaard’s position regarding the centrality of the second-person perspective in ethics 
(Korsgaard, 1996; 2007). 
• Second-person perspective: Person 1 says to E, “You have decided to do A because 
R3” 
The second-person perspective on A belongs to someone in conversation with the 
entrepreneur who decides to do A. Admittedly, it would be a little peculiar for Person 1 to say 
to E what E’s reasons are for doing A. It might be best read as an invitation for E to clarify her 
intended action and the reasons justifying it. It may be more common for someone in Person 
1’s position to say, “You should/should-not do A for reason R3”. We are less interested in what 
is specifically said than what the speaker and the entrepreneurial actor are doing in these sorts 
of conversations more broadly: sharing a perspective by sharing ends and reasons with one 
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another. One could, for example, imagine Person 1 as being some sort of mentor. In order to 
be a successful mentor, Person 1 cannot treat E as a mere data-point to be explained. Rather, 
Person 1 must value and respect E’s chosen ends as they reason together about the 
appropriateness of different means to reach those ends. It would be inappropriate for Person 1 
to attempt to make mere predictions about E and her actions instead of sincerely discussing 
with her the reasonableness of the actions that she is considering. For example, it would be 
inappropriate for Person 1 to say that E has decided to be an entrepreneur because she came 
from a family of entrepreneurs, or that E discovered and pursues some opportunity because she 
has such-and-such background knowledge. While such statements may be true, E is likely to 
find them irrelevant to her decisions about whether she should become an entrepreneur 
pursuing such opportunities. Such statements would be suggestive of a lack of shared 
perspective between Person 1 and E because they are about the entrepreneur rather than 
directed to the entrepreneur as a decision-maker—unless the entrepreneur herself was viewing 
her action or decision as a phenomenon to be explained rather than as something to be 
practically deliberated about.  
 Adopting the second-person practical perspective towards entrepreneurs and their 
actions has the benefit of allowing us to share in entrepreneurs’ first-person perspectives 
without ourselves being the entrepreneurs we study. Doing so would enable us to calibrate the 
detached third-person theoretical perspective common to much entrepreneurship research 
while also bringing new concepts and perspectives into scholarly conversations. 
 
Conducting Entrepreneurship Research from the Second-Person Practical Perspective 
 It is one thing to know that we entrepreneurship scholars should adopt a second-person 
practical perspective on entrepreneurs and their actions; it is another thing to know how we 
should conduct entrepreneurship research in this way. How do we complement the third-person 
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theoretical perspective on entrepreneurship with a second-person practical perspective? In 
order to begin answering that question, we re-examine the third-person perspective on reasons 
for entrepreneurial action. 
 
• Third-person perspective: Person 2 says to Person 3, “E has decided to do A 
because R3” 
 
 What distinguishes the third-person perspective from the second-person perspective is 
neither the absence of perspective sharing nor mutual accountability. After all, Person 2 and 
Person 3 may very well be sharing ends and reasons with one another in regard to explaining 
and predicting E’s actions. They would thus be making themselves accountable to and sharing 
practical perspectives with one another. The distinguishing feature of the third-person 
perspective consists in the fact that the speaker and hearer are not holding themselves 
accountable to, and therefore not sharing a perspective with, the person whose action they are 
discussing. This makes it substantively different from the first and second-person perspectives. 
What Person 2 and Person 3 are going to treat as good reasons for why entrepreneur E does 
action A will depend upon how Person 2 and Person 3 hold one another responsible for the 
reasons that they give—regardless of how their own views align with those whose action they 
are theorizing about. A good example of this can be seen in the peer review process in academic 
publishing (though it also holds in more informal ordinary conversations as well). A scientific 
discipline develops particular standards of rigour in virtue of how its members hold one another 
responsible for what they say. What is taken to be adequate evidence for some proposition in 
a discipline is whatever members of that discipline are willing to accept as adequate evidence. 
These standards change over time and differ across groups. 
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Correspondingly, the particular standards to which scholars within a scientific 
discipline are held accountable with regards to what conclusions they can appropriately draw 
(e.g. what propositions they can justify or refute) depends crucially on whom they make 
themselves accountable to. This is equally true of linguistic communities (and 
subcommunities) more broadly. When a botanist writes a peer reviewed journal article about 
fruits to other botanists, they care not that lay persons and customs officials often classify fruits 
differently than their fellow botanists do—for example in classifying tomatoes as vegetables. 
The botanist (in this context) is in conversation with other botanists for the goal of doing 
biological science, not for cooking nor for administering customs laws. However, if the botanist 
were talking to a customs officer about how they might legally transfer a large amount of 
tomatoes across the border then they are making themselves accountable to the customs agent 
for the sake of adhering to customs laws. In this context, the botanist is transporting vegetables 
and it is largely irrelevant that tomatoes are classified as fruit amongst his botanist colleagues. 
The botanist is not and should not hold herself nor the customs agent responsible to other 
botanists as if they were publishing in a peer-reviewed biology journal. Given their shared 
ends, they should be concerned with legal rather than biological standards of justification.  
What the above example of the botanist illustrates is that questions of what standards 
one holds oneself accountable to go hand in hand with question of whom one holds oneself 
accountable to. Most contemporary entrepreneurship scholarship takes a third-person 
perspective on entrepreneurial actions and their reasons. Typically, when entrepreneurship 
scholars publish journal articles, we make ourselves accountable to our scholarly peers, not the 
entrepreneurs whose actions we are writing about. That is, the conversation that we join as 
entrepreneurship scholars may be about entrepreneurs, their actions, and their reasons for 
acting, but it is not a conversation in which the entrepreneurs being studied participate. Because 
entrepreneurs are not taking part in the conversation, scholars are not directly accountable to 
 21 
them and are thus free to theorize about the reasons for entrepreneurial action in ways that may 
diverge significantly from how the entrepreneurs being discussed conceptualize their own 
actions and reasons. 
It is for similar reasons that entrepreneurship scholars cannot access entrepreneurs 
practical decision-making perspectives simply by having entrepreneurs fill out questionnaires. 
A questionnaire will not substitute for a genuine conversation because it attempts to force the 
entrepreneur to understand the practical perspective of the researcher rather than the other way 
around. The whole interaction between the researcher and entrepreneur becomes framed 
around the entrepreneur assisting the researcher. An entrepreneur sincerely participates in the 
research project because they value what researcher is doing even if they only have a vague 
conception of what it is. They might even be highly dismissive of the relevance of management 
research to their own venture, but nonetheless respect that some people value doing research. 
The participating entrepreneur thus makes herself accountable to the researcher by trying to 
interpret and answer the survey questions in ways that will help the researcher. The shared ends 
guiding the interaction is the scholar’s entrepreneurship research project, not the entrepreneur’s 
being successful in their venture. It is likely that the research participant learns more about 
entrepreneurship research than the entrepreneurship scholar learns about entrepreneurship. It 
is also an open question whether entrepreneurship research based on such methods tell us more 
about how entrepreneurs understand and interpret the researcher’s project than they tell us 
about entrepreneurial practice.  
We illustrate this idea in Figure 1. In this diagram, we present the mainstream 
perspective of entrepreneurship research whereby scholars are talking to and accountable to 
one another (as indicated by the solid arrows). They look at what entrepreneurs might say 
(indicated by the dotted arrow) as mere data to be incorporated into their research, yet are 
generally agnostic about the entrepreneur’s own perspective. Entrepreneurs might partially 
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share in a scholar’s perspective by trying to understand and fill questionnaires. The scholar’s 
perspective is constituted by a practical interest in how to conduct rigorous research. They only 
hold themselves accountable to other scholars in doing this. The entrepreneur’s perspective is 
in regards to succeeding in their venturing efforts. They may share their perspective with 
certain key stakeholders. 
 
Figure 1: Mainstream view of scholarship 
 
As entrepreneurship scholars we find ourselves in the following predicament. On the 
one hand we deem it necessary to adopt a third person perspective when we publish our 
research because we make ourselves accountable to other scholars rather than to entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, we need to be able to identify and understand (including appreciate) 
people’s first-person intentions in order to identify and understand them as entrepreneurs 
(particularly in the very early stage of the entrepreneurial process). How do we resolve this 
tension? 
We have to make a practical decision regarding whether, as entrepreneurship scholars, 
we should study entrepreneurs as mere phenomena acting according to regularities, or rather 
as autonomous agents whose actions we can only begin understanding if we share their 
perspective with them. This is the practical problem that we are presently debating and 
exchanging reasons about. It would be fruitless and disingenuous to try and settle this debate 
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about how we should proceed by making predictions about how we will decide—perhaps 
appealing to psycho-social factors.  
 
Mediated Accountability to Entrepreneurs 
A key part of the solution to the challenge just raised is to adopt a second-person 
practical perspective on the entrepreneurial actors and actions that we are studying (as argued 
above). This means not passively observing entrepreneurs, but actively engaging them so that 
we can share their ends and reasons, and thus their perspectives. We do this by acknowledging 
and integrating their entrepreneurial goals such that we make ourselves partial in their success. 
This does not mean that we must become business partners with the entrepreneurs or invest in 
their ventures. At the very least it means that we must engage with entrepreneurs in 
conversation about their ventures. We need to find out what exactly they are trying to, and how 
what they are trying to do is valuable to them, and how they plan to go about achieving their 
desired ends. We then value what they are trying to do not because we want to do the same, 
but simply because those particular ends were chosen by them and because we as 
entrepreneurship scholars (presumably) value successful entrepreneurship. 
A first step for complementing third- with second-person scholarship is bringing the 
entrepreneurs’ practical decision-making perspective to our fellow scholars, so that it plays a 
central role in our shared practice of conducting rigorous entrepreneurship research. It is, after 
all, precisely this perspective which makes the persons we study entrepreneurs and thus 
provides the core content of the practice we claim to study. 
In taking this approach we have a responsibility to accurately present the entrepreneur’s 
perspective of and reasons for what they are doing rather than what we theorists might perceive 
them as “actually” doing for whatever psycho-social reasons. Even though the entrepreneurs 
whom we discuss with our fellow scholars are not part of our scholarly conversations, we 
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should act “as if” the entrepreneurs being discussed were present in our conversations as silent 
participants. We thus act as if they could rebuke us for mischaracterizing their position to 
others. And this raises a difficult question, “How are we actually accountable to the 
entrepreneurs we study when we discuss their perspectives with our fellow scholars?” Our 
answer, and one of our key recommendations for entrepreneurship scholars in this paper, is 
that entrepreneurship scholars should keep one another accountable for conducting 
entrepreneurship research from within entrepreneurs’ practical decision-making perspectives. 
In short, part of entrepreneurship scholars’ shared practice of conducting rigorous research 
should entail adopting a second-person perspective and holding ourselves accountable to the 
entrepreneurs we study.  
We illustrate this idea in Figure 2. Scholars make each other accountable for accurately 
capturing the perspectives and intentions of the entrepreneurs they are studying. The 
responsibility that scholars have to correctly articulate the entrepreneur’s perspective is 
mediated through their responsibility to other scholars. They likewise might only share the 
entrepreneur’s perspective as if they were a silent participant in the entrepreneur’s 
conversation.  
 
Figure 2: Mediated accountability to entrepreneurs 
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This mediated accountability is not ideal, but it is an important step in the right 
direction. Our expectation is that the need for mediated accountability to entrepreneurs through 
other scholars would fade once the practice of entrepreneurship scholarship becomes 
increasingly dependent on and intertwined with the practice of entrepreneurship. Instead of 
discussing entrepreneurs in the third person, scholars will eventually describe themselves and 
their research as sharing in entrepreneurs’ project and perspective of successfully starting new 
businesses, thus leading them to talk about entrepreneurs in the first-person plural: “we”. Most 
scholars will still not be entrepreneurs, and most entrepreneurs will still not be scholars, but 
entrepreneurship scholarship will be sensitive to the practical decision-making perspectives of 
entrepreneurs by making it in integral part of research practice. 
We illustrate this idea in Figure 3. The diagram shows how research and venturing 
practices are brought together. By sharing perspectives, the researcher becomes more attuned 
to entrepreneurial practice and entrepreneurs and stakeholders help define research questions. 
It nonetheless allows that entrepreneurs do not themselves become researchers, and that 
scholars do not themselves become entrepreneurs. Rigorous research will require more 
reciprocity between scholars and entrepreneurs and scholars will make themselves more 
directly accountable to entrepreneurs. Rigour will presume relevance. 
 
Figure 3: Integrative “we” voice 
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Integrating Theoretical Vocabulary with Entrepreneurial Practice 
 Of course, mischaracterization is not the same as characterizing differently. 
Entrepreneurship scholars are free to describe entrepreneurs’ perspectives using various bits of 
theoretical vocabulary so long as it can be plausibly argued that entrepreneurs would be in 
agreement with the characterization if they understood the theoretical vocabulary. For example, 
suppose that an entrepreneur describes themselves as planning to create a business which takes 
particular materials conventionally seen as valueless and transforms them into something 
valuable in unexpected ways. Depending on various other contextual features, it may be very 
appropriate for scholars to characterize this as an instance of “bricolage” (Baker and Nelson, 
2005) even if such a characterization was not available to the entrepreneur themselves. Once 
theoretical vocabulary is used to categorize portions of entrepreneur’s practical decision-
making perspectives, scholars are able to theorize about aspects of entrepreneur’s practical 
perspectives, and perhaps infer new conclusions and recommendations that were not otherwise 
available to the entrepreneurs.  
Scholars play the role of gathering the perspectives of a vast range of entrepreneurs, 
analyzing and debating them with other scholars and then making them available to other 
entrepreneurs to use in their decision making. Instead of seeing entrepreneurship scholarship 
as a repository of facts largely detached from entrepreneurs’ own perspectives or interests, we 
see entrepreneurship scholarship as a complex network (almost a platform) through which 
entrepreneurs can share and learn from the entrepreneurial experiences of others. 
The responsibility that scholars have towards the entrepreneurs they study is in some 
ways analogous to the responsibility that a lawyer has towards her clients. The lawyer is 
responsible for representing the interests of their clients when negotiating on their clients’ 
behalves even if their clients are not present at the negotiations. Furthermore, lawyers are also 
free to translate their clients’ positions into the appropriate legalese to more effectively achieve 
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the desired legal objectives—even though the clients themselves did not use such terminology 
when making their positions known to the lawyer. It would be unethical, however, for the 
lawyer to present their client’s position in legal terminology that mischaracterizes the client’s 
position, such that they come across as agreeing to something that they never intended to agree 
to. 
 
Discussion 
In the preceding sections, we presented arguments for making entrepreneurship 
researchers accountable to the entrepreneurs we study and embedding such accountability in 
our research practices. This involves developing sensitivity and allegiance to entrepreneurs’ 
practical decision-making perspectives via the adoption of a second-person perspective of the 
entrepreneurial process and integrating this perspective into our work. We envision that, 
instead of discussing entrepreneurs exclusively in the detached sense of a third person, scholars 
will eventually describe themselves and their research as sharing in entrepreneurs’ projects and 
perspective of venturing into the unknown, thereby adopting the first-person plural “we”. A 
number of implications arise from this line of reasoning, prompting us to reflect upon our 
research practices, highlighting new paths forward and identifying latent strengths.  
 
Connecting with entrepreneurs’ first-person perspective. 
By articulating and advocating a second-person view, we call on scholars to develop 
sensitivity and responsibility towards the entrepreneurial community. Insofar as the 
entrepreneurial intention/vision is essential to entrepreneurial practice, theorizing about what 
is essential to entrepreneurial practice must be done from within the entrepreneurial 
perspective, and not wholly imposed from scholars’ (purported) bird’s-eye perspective on 
entrepreneurial practice. This means that the theoretical propositions that we propose and test 
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as part of our scholarly activity should make contact with entrepreneurs’ practical perspectives, 
such that at least some of the constructs related in those propositions must be identifiably part 
of the practical decision-making perspective of the entrepreneurs being studied. These might 
be as simple as the types of companies the entrepreneurs intend to create, the various risks the 
entrepreneurs associate with their respective ventures, or their motivations (i.e. reasons given) 
for starting a firm. These are not mere “psychological” characteristics of the entrepreneur any 
more than entrepreneurship scholar’s reasons for choosing one theory over another is purely 
“psychological”. To treat them as such is to take an exclusive third-person perspective. These 
are the entrepreneurs’ reasons that make up their respective perspectives. This is the space that 
we need to inhabit if we want to theorize about what is uniquely entrepreneurial. 
 
Being a silent participant in entrepreneurs’ conversations 
Entrepreneurship scholars can adopt a second-person perspective towards 
entrepreneurs and their reasons for acting without directly engaging in conversation with the 
entrepreneurs they study. We may, for example, learn much about entrepreneurs’ first-person 
perspective by examining the conversations that those entrepreneurs have with their business 
partners, mentors, or key stakeholders. But when we interpret these conversations, we need to 
do so as if we were part of the conversation, assessing the reasonableness of the reasons being 
exchanged in the conversations—not to determine whether the entrepreneurs are ultimately 
correct, but in order to share in and thus understand entrepreneurs’ decision-making 
perspectives. It is in these reasons that we find the intentions that distinguish entrepreneurs 
from non-entrepreneurs. 
However, the entrepreneur’s conversations that we use for evidence in support of our 
scholarly research need to adopt the entrepreneur’s problem-solving perspectives on their 
venture. This rules out using as data those conversations about entrepreneurs’ ventures where 
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entrepreneurs are exchanging reasons with persons who do not themselves care about, nor wish 
to share the entrepreneurs’ practical decision-making perspective about their venture. For 
example, when an entrepreneur registers their business or fills out a survey, she will likely 
attempt to adopt the practical decision-making perspective of those who process the business 
registration or who are conducting the survey, rather than the other way around. The 
information provided in these ways will therefore not reveal the entrepreneurs’ own practical 
decision-making perspective regarding advancing their venture. 
 
Building on the strengths of conventional research methods 
We anticipate that second-person entrepreneurship scholarship could be interpreted as 
a threat to conventional entrepreneurship research. It might be argued, for example, that 
entrepreneurship scholars should not engage in complex theorizing or apply sophisticated 
research methods because these practices are not part of entrepreneurs’ own first-person 
practical decision-making perspective. This is not at all our position. Through its broader, 
deeply reflective, inter-disciplinary insights, our scholarly research can enrich entrepreneurial 
practice. Indeed, entrepreneurs value conversations with academics because of the questions 
we ask and the way we reflect back their points. Our valued ability to interpret, connect and 
synthesize is reflected in Lewin’s famous maxim “there is nothing so practical as a good 
theory”.  
To this end a mere relabelling of the features of entrepreneurs’ perspectives is unfruitful 
unless it allows entrepreneurs to make new and useful inferences in their decision-making 
practices. This is where theoretical propositions come into play. They propose new inferences 
that can be made between the different theoretical concepts (or constructs) that address features 
of entrepreneurs first-person practical decision-making perspective. Thus, scholarly practice 
can be roughly understood as aiming to determine which propositions (and thus which 
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inferences) are correct by developing and applying expertise in various sorts of research 
methods. In regards to the correct application of theory and research methods, scholars 
probably should not hold themselves accountable to entrepreneurs, but other scholars. In this 
domain they are the experts. However, scholars will still need to make themselves accountable 
to and actively engage entrepreneurs in order to determine which propositions actually pertain 
to entrepreneur’s first-person perspective and can thus act as a practical reason for 
entrepreneurs. If the proposition makes no contact with entrepreneurs’ first-person 
entrepreneurial intentions then we have to seriously question whether that proposition actually 
pertains to entrepreneurship (as opposed to people or social actors more broadly).  
While second-person entrepreneurship research does not prevent the use of 
conventional research methods, it may complicate it. For example, suppose we want to research 
how entrepreneurs manage or adapt to various sorts of risk that they encounter with their 
ventures. From a third-person research perspective we might measure risk in terms of various 
features belonging to entrepreneurs’ local economy, and the risks associated with their chosen 
industry. Risk, as it is measured in this perspective, is simply a feature of the totalizing view 
of the environment and not necessarily part of entrepreneurs’ first-person practical decision-
making perspective. Practicing entrepreneurs may identify and assess risk entirely differently 
from us or from one another, and these differences may have a substantial impact on how they 
conceptualize what they are doing. Studying entrepreneurs from a second-person perspective 
requires that we interpret entrepreneurs’ various idiosyncratic perspectives before assessing 
which aspects of their perspectives instantiate the theoretical constructs we are interested in.  
When we present theoretical statements about an entrepreneurial action to our fellow 
scholars, we need to do so from the perspective of someone being part of the entrepreneur’s 
conversation. We thus bring fellow scholars into the conversation, while trying to keep 
ourselves accountable to the entrepreneurs whose conversations we are discussing—as if they 
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were silent participants in our scholarly conversation. Insofar as the entrepreneurial 
intention/vision is essential to entrepreneurial practice, theorizing about what is essential to 
entrepreneurial practice must be sensitive to the view within the entrepreneurial perspective. 
Therefore, in recommending second-person research perspective we by no means oppose the 
use of rigorous research methodologies. Rather, our aim is to increase the rigour of 
entrepreneurship research by encouraging scholars to adopt the more integrative second-person 
perspective that is more effective for studying the intentions distinctive of entrepreneurial 
practice. A fruitful step in this direction is building on interpretivist approaches that focus on 
closer understanding of intentions and personal meaning in a forward-looking sense (Packard, 
2017; Nordqvist, Hall, and Melin, 2009). Another example is the accompanying paper by 
Shepherd and Gruber (2020), which seeks to integrate the vocabulary of the Lean Start-up 
community of contemporary entrepreneurial practice with the theoretical vocabulary of 
entrepreneurial scholars.  And there is also the performative approach to entrepreneurship, 
focusing on how the meaning of entrepreneurial actions is made and re-made over time and 
emphasizing what entrepreneurs do and say in practice (Garud, Gehman, and Giuliani, 2018).  
 
The value of theoretical concepts  
At this point one might agree that conventional empirical research methods are useful 
when conducting second-person perspective entrepreneurship research, yet still be sceptical 
about the value of theoretical concepts or constructs that are not native to entrepreneurs’ first-
person perspective. Against this worry, we argue that our emphasis on the importance of 
entrepreneurs’ first-person perspective does not diminish but rather enhances the value of 
abstract entrepreneurship theory—so long as the entrepreneurship theory addresses features 
relevant to entrepreneurs’ first-person perspective. Part of what makes entrepreneurship 
scholarship worthwhile is that it can provide entrepreneurs with new ways of conceptualizing 
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their entrepreneurial practices. However, if we instead took a purely third-person research 
perspective then entrepreneurship theory will have much less value for practicing 
entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurship research provides concepts that can change practice, e.g. effectuation, 
creative destruction, business model, disruptive innovation, bricolage, etc. Our scholarly 
contribution thus lies in providing a meta-structure that lets us compare, analyse, and share the 
experiences and perspectives between entrepreneurs. New concepts can provide fruitful new 
ways of perceiving. For example, in Deutscher’s (2011) engaging account of language and 
perception, the word for blue was the last to appear in human languages. Thus, in ancient times,  
Homer would describe the sea as “wine-dark” in the Odyssey and people could detect colour 
differences but fail to give them separate names. As blue things are relatively rare in nature, 
the only ancient culture with a word for blue were the Egyptians, who were also the only culture 
able to produce blue dye. The broader point here is that classificatory consciousness, or 
claiming that something is thus-and-so, involves learning, concept formation, and the use of 
symbols: “instead of coming to have concept of something because we have noticed that sort 
of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort 
of thing, and cannot account for it” (Sellars, 1963: 176).    
Just as the introduction of new colour concepts provide new ways of seeing, so too can 
the scholarly introduction of new concepts provide new ways for entrepreneurs to frame and 
think through their practical decision-making problems. As we illustrated with the concept of 
“bricolage”, scholarly concepts can reveal something important across multiple entrepreneurs’ 
practical decision-making perspectives and enable us to highlight, study and compare different 
entrepreneurial practices. We might, for example, classify different ways that entrepreneurs 
conceptualize their venture, or decide to develop their business in one direction rather than 
another. Or we can give a name to something that entrepreneurs intuitively do, such as in the 
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concept of effectuation as a different logic of action (Sarasvathy, 2001). Given how different 
entrepreneurs are from one another, significant interpretive work is required to engage different 
entrepreneurs’ perspectives to determine whether they can be classified one way rather than 
another. The conceptual language that arises from this process facilitates perception, reflection, 
communication and learning.  
After all, most of us hold the title of PhD – Doctor of Philosophy – and philosophy is 
“the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts… All concepts are connected to 
problems without which they would have no meaning” (Deleuze and Gattari, 1994). At stake 
here is whether the problems that give rise to concepts are the ones that entrepreneurs 
experience (i.e. first-person view) or ones that scholars experience in discussing entrepreneurs 
amongst themselves (i.e. third-person view). The important bit is that the concepts we create 
to give the recommendations we give are both based on and are directed to the practical 
decision-making perspective of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who learn to use these concepts 
themselves will acquire new ways of reflecting upon and understanding their actions via the 
logic of the theories the concepts belong to. They now have an additional framework which 
has been vetted by entrepreneurship scholars (and their peer review practices) who have made 
themselves accountable to entrepreneurs 
Adopting a second-person perspective within our entrepreneurship research allows us 
to think more deeply about what our practice of theorizing can bring to the practice of 
entrepreneurship. When theorists adopt the second-person perspective towards entrepreneurs 
it brings the two practices and their associated accountabilities together. In this way, theoretical 
concepts play a dual role. On the one hand they help make sense of the entrepreneur’s 
perspective; on the other hand they have theoretical significance in discourse between scholars. 
 
A new approach to collapsing the theory-practice divide  
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We attribute the theory-practice divide to the adoption of two mutually exclusive 
deployments of reason: the logic of causal explanation/prediction is different from the logic of 
practical justification. As Korsgaard’s perspective helps flesh out, the former generates a 
conversation about entrepreneurs and their actions as objective facts to be described and 
explained; while the latter generates conversation addressed to entrepreneurs about what 
actions should be done. The gap will persist to the extent that scholarly conversations about 
entrepreneurship fail to engage the practical decision-making perspective of practicing 
entrepreneurs. But the way for entrepreneurship scholarship to engage the practical decision-
making perspective of practicing entrepreneurs is by those conducting such scholarship to 
make themselves accountable to those practicing entrepreneurship. Talking to entrepreneurs to 
understand their reasons and thus their perspective naturally eliminates the theory-practice 
divide by intertwining the practice of theorizing with the practice of entrepreneurship. While 
scholars need not be entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs need not be scholars, entrepreneurship 
scholarship can be conducted from within the practical decision-making perspectives of 
entrepreneurs, and entrepreneurs can make use of entrepreneurship scholarship that addresses 
the practical problems they face 
This entails moving away from what Dewey (1960) terms “spectator theory of 
knowledge”, whereby the object of knowledge “has being prior to and independent of the 
operations of knowing” (196). This attempt to isolate and extract – to distil knowledge into 
something that is situation-, person- and value-free – also strips theoretical objects of their 
significance and relevance for human purposes by severing the connections to the background 
whole that make them intelligible in practice (Dreyfus, 1991). Even if such a-contextual 
abstract knowledge is useful for explaining the past from a third-person perspective, it may fail 
to address anything practically relevant in people’s first-person practical decision-making 
contexts. 
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The second-person view thus plays a mediating role between the “high ground” of well 
defined problems that lend themselves to technical solutions and the “swampy lowland” of 
confusing problems that defy technical solutions (Schon, 1987). It can translate the a-personal 
nature of the third-person view into principles which entrepreneurs can internalize (i.e. they 
become actionable). Similarly, it can translate the immersed nature of the first-person view into 
broader insights to which others can relate. Perhaps this is as simple as not losing sight of 
Henry Bergson’s maxim, “Think like a man of action, act like a man of thought.”  The second-
person view can help populate the abstract categories of scientific explanation with the content 
of discursive and other social practices. This will enable scholars and entrepreneur to connect 
diverse experiences and develop mutual sensitivity and a spirit of solidarity. After all, they 
share a common goal of making the world a better place.  
 
Conclusion 
The ‘ivory tower’ of academia conveys a traditional sense of privileged seclusion and 
separation from practicalities. For many years, the field of entrepreneurship research fought 
for gaining entry and legitimacy within academia. Now that we are inside, we need to reclaim 
the sensitivity that gave rise to the field in the first place. A robust scholarly voice finds an 
integrative “we” that brings together the practices of research and venturing.  
We can complement the rigor of reproducibility that arises from a third-person stance, 
with the rigour of interpretation that accrues from a second-person perspective. In addition to 
focusing on whether some result is reproducible, we should focus on developing fruitful 
interpretations as to why the results are different in different contexts. Adopting a second-
person perspective to interpret an entrepreneur’s first-person perspective means understanding 
the reasonableness of their reasons from our own lights. Better interpretations are those that 
help us see more rather than less reason in what entrepreneurs say and do, and can account for 
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more of what they say and do (Davidson 1975). The second-person perspective involves a 
critical normative dimension of assessment which the third-person perspective does not.  
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